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Warrantless Home Arrests and Police Liability  
Under Utah Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Well-intentioned law enforcement officers in Utah beware. The 
forced entry statute found in section 77-7-8 of the Utah Code 
violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The plain language of this statute misleads peace officers as to the 
scope of their authority to make warrantless home arrests. Since 
1980, three decisions by the United States Supreme Court have 
established constitutional protections against warrantless home 
arrests,1 yet section 77-7-8 continues to authorize peace officers to 
force entry into a building to make a warrantless arrest, even if the 
building in question is a dwelling and even if there are no exigent 
circumstances2 present. Consequently, police officers in the field, 
relying on section 77-7-8, might misunderstand the scope of their 
authority and commit unnecessary, unknowing violations of the 
Fourth Amendment by making unjustified warrantless home arrests. 
A decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit suggests that officers who act in good faith and precisely 
according to the rules articulated by the Utah Legislature might find 
themselves subject to civil liability without the protections of 
qualified immunity, making them personally liable for any damages.3 
To explore this potential police liability trap, Part II reviews 
three modern United States Supreme Court cases that govern 
warrantless arrests within the home. Part III identifies the conflict 
between Utah law and current Fourth Amendment case law and 
analyzes the possible outcomes of a constitutional challenge to 
 
 1. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 
204 (1981); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
 2. Courts define exigent circumstances as “those ‘that would cause a reasonable person 
to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other 
persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other 
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.’” State v. Beavers, 859 
P.2d 9, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984)). 
 3. See Howard v. Dickerson, 34 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 1994); see also infra Part III.B. 
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section 77-7-8. Part III also examines the practical problems that 
may result from officers exercising authority under the current 
version of section 77-7-8. In Part IV, this Note proposes a revision 
of Utah’s forced entry statute and provides a model that incorporates 
modern search and seizure jurisprudence. Part V gives a brief 
conclusion. 
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WARRANTLESS HOME ARRESTS 
The Fourth Amendment provides protection from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.4 
Since 1980, three United States Supreme Court decisions have 
shaped constitutional law regarding warrantless home arrests and 
have defined the level of protection that the Fourth Amendment 
provides a residence. Collectively, the cases impose significant 
limitations upon law enforcement officers seeking to make arrests 
within dwellings. Payton v. New York5 was the first of these cases to 
be decided. 
A. Payton v. New York 
In Payton v. New York, the United States Supreme Court held 
that, absent exigent circumstances, the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment prohibit police from entering a suspect’s dwelling to 
make a warrantless arrest.6 In making its ruling, the Court examined 
two cases in which police officers had probable cause to make felony 
arrests but entered the suspects’ homes without first obtaining arrest 
warrants. 
In the first case, officers forced entry into the apartment of 
suspected murderer Theodore Payton. Having developed probable 
cause, officers arrived at the residence with the intent to arrest 
Payton without a warrant for the killing of a gas station manager, 
 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 5. Payton, 445 U.S. 573. 
 6. Id. 
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which took place two days earlier.7 Upon arrival, the officers 
discovered lights on and music playing, but no one would answer the 
door.8 The officers forced entry, and they discovered that the 
apartment was unoccupied. Although unable to arrest Payton, 
officers seized as evidence an ammunition casing observed in plain 
view.9 
The trial judge denied Payton’s motion to suppress the evidence 
and ruled that exigent circumstances justified officers entering the 
apartment without announcing their presence.10 Finding statutory 
authorization for the entry, the judge did not determine whether the 
officers were justified in failing to obtain an arrest warrant prior to 
entry.11 The appellate division affirmed.12 
The second case concerned a warrantless entry of Obie Riddick’s 
home.13 Officers had probable cause to believe that Riddick 
committed two armed robberies. When officers knocked on the 
door, Riddick’s son opened it. Upon seeing Riddick sitting on a bed, 
officers entered and arrested him. Officers discovered drugs and 
paraphernalia in the nearby dresser.14 
Riddick’s arrest occurred more than four years after the arrest of 
Theodore Payton, and the New York statute had since been 
revised.15 The trial court refused to suppress the evidence, finding 
 
 7. Id. at 576. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 576–77. 
 10. Id. at 577 n.6. Officers were authorized to force entry to make a felony arrest if they 
announced their presence and purpose. The trial court dispensed with this requirement based 
on its finding of exigency. See id. n.7. 
 11. Id. at 578. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Incident to arrest, police officers are permitted to search the arrestee’s person, as 
well as the area within his immediate control, without a warrant. Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 15. Payton, 445 U.S. at 578–79. Payton was arrested in 1970, and the applicable New 
York statute was revised in 1971, three years prior to Riddick’s arrest in 1974: 
New York Crim. Proc. Law § 140.15(4) (McKinney 1971) provides, with respect to 
arrest without a warrant: 
In order to effect such an arrest, a police officer may enter premises in which 
he reasonably believes such person to be present, under the same circumstances 
and in the same manner as would be authorized, by the provisions of 
subdivisions four and five of section 120.80, if he were attempting to make 
such arrest pursuant to a warrant of arrest. 
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that the new version of the statute authorized the entry, and the 
Appellate Division affirmed.16 New York’s highest court 
simultaneously addressed the appeals of both Payton and Riddick. 
1. New York Court of Appeals review of Payton cases 
In a 4–3 decision, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed both 
convictions and determined that entry of a suspect’s home to effect a 
warrantless arrest is constitutional.17 Drawing a distinction between 
entering a dwelling to search and entering a dwelling to arrest an 
occupant, the majority found that there is less intrusion of privacy 
when entry is made for purposes of arrest.18 The majority found 
support for this distinction in both historic and modern contexts.19 
 
Section 120.80, governing execution of arrest warrants, provides in relevant part: 
4. In order to effect the arrest, the police officer may, under circumstances and 
in a manner prescribed in this subdivision, enter any premises in which he 
reasonably believes the defendant to be present. Before such entry, he must 
give, or make reasonable effort to give, notice of his authority and purpose to 
an occupant thereof, unless there is reasonable cause to believe that the giving 
of such notice will: 
(a) Result in the defendant escaping or attempting to escape; or 
(b) Endanger the life or safety of the officer or another person; or 
(c) Result in the destruction, damaging or secretion of material evidence. 
5. If the officer is authorized to enter premises without giving notice of his 
authority and purpose, or if after giving such notice he is not admitted, he may 
enter such premises, and by a breaking if necessary. 
Id. at 578 n.9. 
 16. Id. at 578–79. 
 17. Id. at 579. 
 18. Id. at 579–80. The majority opinion explained that a distinction must be drawn 
between entering a residence to conduct a search and entering to apprehend a criminal: 
At least as important, and perhaps even more so, in concluding that entries to make 
arrests are not “unreasonable”—the substantive test under the constitutional 
proscriptions—is the objective for which they are made, viz., the arrest of one 
reasonably believed to have committed a felony, with resultant protection to the 
community. The “reasonableness” of any governmental intrusion is to be judged 
from two perspectives—that of the defendant, considering the degree and scope of 
the invasion of his person or property; that of the People, weighing the objective 
and imperative of governmental action. The community’s interest in the 
apprehension of criminal suspects is of a higher order than is its concern for the 
recovery of contraband or evidence; normally the hazards created by the failure to 
apprehend far exceed the risks which may follow nonrecovery. 
Id. at 580–81 n.13 (quoting People v. Payton, 380 N.E.2d 224, 228–29 (N.Y. 1978)). 
 19. Id. at 581 n.14 (referring to “apparent historical acceptance in the English common 
law” and statutory authorization by several states to make such arrests). 
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The dissenting trio argued that absent exigent circumstances,20 
warrantless entry of a suspect’s home to make an arrest violated the 
Fourth Amendment.21 Viewing entry to seize a person as a greater 
invasion of privacy than entry to search, the dissenters argued for 
heightened constitutional protection from warrantless home 
arrests.22 
2. United States Supreme Court review of Payton cases 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve 
the question of whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits police 
from entering a suspect’s home without consent to make a 
warrantless felony arrest.23 After noting that “[u]nreasonable 
searches or seizures conducted without any warrant at all are 
condemned by the plain language of the first clause of the [Fourth] 
Amendment,”24 the Court looked to the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment and called physical invasion of the home “the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”25 
The Court answered the question regarding warrantless home arrests 
in unequivocal terms: 
[T]he critical point is that any differences in the intrusiveness of 
entries to search and entries to arrest are merely ones of degree 
rather than kind. The two intrusions share this fundamental 
characteristic: the breach of the entrance to an individual’s home. 
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a 
variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly 
defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical 
dimensions of an individual’s home—a zone that finds its roots in 
clear and specific constitutional terms: “The right of the people to 
 
 20. See supra note 2. 
 21. Payton, 445 U.S. at 581. 
 22. Id. at 581–82. The New York Court of Appeals dissenters acknowledged the 
historical and modern support for the majority position but argued that “neither antiquity nor 
legislative unanimity can be determinative of the grave constitutional question presented” and 
cannot replace proper judicial analysis. People v. Payton, 380 N.E.2d at 238 (Cooke, J., 
dissenting). 
 23. Payton, 445 U.S. at 582–83. The Court did not examine whether the entries were 
justified by exigent circumstances and explicitly reserved the question of whether police could 
enter a third party’s home without an arrest or search warrant in order to arrest a person. 
 24. Id. at 585. 
 25. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 
(1972)). 
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be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.” That 
language unequivocally establishes the proposition that “[at] the 
very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to 
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.” In terms that apply equally to seizures of 
property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn 
a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, 
that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.26 
The Court then conducted its own analysis of common law 
support for warrantless home entries and concluded that “the 
absence of any 17th- or 18th-century English cases directly in point, 
together with the unequivocal endorsement of the tenet that ‘a 
man’s house is his castle,’ strongly suggests that the prevailing 
practice was not to make such arrests except in hot pursuit or when 
authorized by a warrant.”27 A review of recent state high court 
decisions revealed that, of twelve states to address the issue, only 
New York and Florida upheld warrantless entries for purposes of 
arrest in the face of direct constitutional challenges, weakening 
reliance upon widespread statutory authorization of the practice.28 
Finally, the Supreme Court dispensed with policy arguments 
against requiring a warrant to enter a home and explained that “an 
arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it 
the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives 
when there is reason to believe that the suspect is within.”29 The 
 
 26. Id. at 589–90 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 27. Id. at 598. 
 28. Id. at 599–600; see also id. at 575 n.4. The Court also noted that the declining trend 
by states to support such warrantless entries was more than a mere ten-to-two vote: 
Seven state courts have recently held that warrantless home arrests violate their 
respective State Constitutions. That is significant because by invoking a state 
constitutional provision, a state court immunizes its decision from review by this 
Court. This heightened degree of immutability underscores the depth of the 
principle underlying the result. 
Id. at 600 (citation and footnote omitted). 
 29. Id. at 603. How far this implicit authority extends is unclear. The Payton court gave 
the following explanation: 
It is true that an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search 
warrant requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate’s determination 
of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen. If there is sufficient 
evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his 
arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to 
the officers of the law. Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant 
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a 
BEL-FIN 11/15/2002 4:46 PM 
1131] Warrantless Home Arrests 
 1137 
Court did not determine whether the arrest warrant also carried with 
it the authority to enter homes of third parties. 
B. Steagald v. United States 
Just one year later, in Steagald v. United States,30 the Supreme 
Court answered the question that Payton did not: in order to arrest a 
suspect in the home of a third-party, officers must possess a search 
warrant, not just an arrest warrant, before entering the third-party 
residence absent consent or exigent circumstances. 
In Steagald, officers were aware of an outstanding arrest warrant 
for fugitive Ricky Lyons. When the Drug Enforcement 
Administration received a tip from an informant as to the 
whereabouts of Lyons, it assembled an arrest team and went to the 
address corresponding to Lyons’s supposedly temporary telephone 
number.31 Gary Steagald and another man stood outside of the 
home when officers arrived. When officers determined that neither of 
the two men were Lyons, they forced their way inside and searched 
the residence.32 Although the officers did not locate Lyons, they did 
observe what they suspected to be cocaine.33 After obtaining a search 
warrant, officers discovered an additional forty-three pounds of 
cocaine.34 
Holding that the officers could rely on the Lyons arrest warrant 
to make entry into Steagald’s home, the United States District Court 
 
dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is 
within. 
Id. at 602–03. 
Thus, the blanket statement that an arrest warrant has implicit authority to enter the 
suspect’s home is immediately preceded by reference to commission of a felony offense. It 
remains unclear whether the implicit authority to enter only applies to arrest warrants for 
felony offenses or whether it applies to all arrest warrants. Moreover, the Court states that the 
authority is “to enter,” yet it makes no reference to forcible entry. Of course, the officers in 
Payton used crowbars to make forced entry, so it seems that the authority “to enter” includes 
forcible entry. Given these ambiguities, however, it is preferable for the time being to have 
subsection (2) of the proposal recognize the authorization of a warrant, whether explicit or 
implicit. See infra Part IV. 
 30. 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
 31. Id. at 206. The informant indicated that Lyons would be available at a supplied 
telephone number for the next twenty-four hours. Agents received the corresponding address 
from the telephone company and responded to the address with an arrest team two days later. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 207. 
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denied Steagald’s motion to suppress the evidence, and Steagald was 
convicted of federal drug charges.35 The Fifth Circuit affirmed on 
appeal.36 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve 
the conflict among the circuits as to whether an arrest warrant 
permitted law enforcement to enter the homes of persons not named 
in the warrant in order to apprehend the named suspect.37 As in 
Payton, the Court rejected arguments that common law and policy 
reasons mandate authority to make such warrantless entries.38 The 
Court reasoned that an arrest warrant, while protecting the right of 
the named suspect from an unreasonable seizure, did nothing to 
shield third-party residences from unreasonable searches.39 To rule 
otherwise could create significant potential for abuse by police and 
could allow arrest warrants to “serve as the pretext for entering a 
home in which the police have a suspicion, but not probable cause to 
believe, that illegal activity is taking place.”40 
In sum, Payton and Steagald combine to demonstrate the force 
of the presumption that a warrantless home entry is unreasonable. 
Absent consent or exigent circumstances, police officers must obtain 
an arrest warrant in order to enter a suspect’s home to make an 
arrest. When the named suspect of an arrest warrant is within a third-
party’s home, officers must obtain a search warrant to justify entry. 
The Court soon made it clear, however, that probable cause, when 
coupled with exigent circumstances, does not automatically justify 
warrantless home arrests in all situations. 
C. Welsh v. Wisconsin 
In Welsh v. Wisconsin,41 the United States Supreme Court further 
limited police authority to make in-home warrantless arrests. In 
Welsh, a witness observed a car swerving along the road before it 
came to a stop in an open field.42 No personal injury or property 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; see also id. n.3. 
 38. Id. at 217–22. 
 39. Id. at 213. 
 40. Id. at 215. “Armed solely with an arrest warrant for a single person, the police could 
search all the homes of that individual’s friends and acquaintances.” Id. 
 41. 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
 42. Id. at 742. 
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damage occurred. The driver exited the car and walked home.43 
When officers responded, they discovered that the abandoned car 
was registered to the defendant, Edward G. Welsh, who lived within 
walking distance of the scene.44 Officers went to the residence, 
gained entry, and went into the bedroom where they found Welsh 
lying in bed.45 The officers arrested the defendant without a warrant 
for driving while intoxicated.46 At the time, the offense of driving 
while intoxicated was classified as a non-jailable traffic offense, 
punishable by fine only.47 The Court found Welsh’s warrantless 
arrest in the home to be unlawful: 
[A]n important factor to be considered when determining whether 
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for 
which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no exigency is 
created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a 
serious crime has been committed, application of the exigent-
circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be 
sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor 
offense . . . has been committed.48 
Thus, a warrantless arrest in the home is less likely to be justified by 
exigent circumstances if the underlying offense is minor. 
This limitation is not clearly defined, and officers should be 
aware that even when probable cause to arrest is coupled with 
apparently exigent circumstances, a warrantless home arrest for a 
minor offense might be viewed as a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment under the reasoning in Welsh.49 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 743. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 746. 
 48. Id. at 753 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 49. Because the holding in Welsh has yet to be clearly defined, it would be far more 
difficult to incorporate it into a revision of section 77-7-8. This Note focuses primarily on the 
need to revise the statute to incorporate the more clearly established holdings in Payton and 
Steagald, but Welsh is discussed because it represents a constitutional limitation on the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Should the scope of Welsh be clarified in 
the future, it may be necessary to incorporate it into the forced entry statute as well because 
qualified immunity will be denied if Welsh is viewed as a clearly established right. See infra 
notes 79, 81, 91. 
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III. UTAH’S STATUTORY CONFLICT WITH MODERN CASE LAW 
Twenty years have passed since the United States Supreme Court 
promulgated the rules in Payton, Steagald, and Welsh. Utah’s forced 
entry arrest statute plainly conflicts with these points of well-settled 
constitutional law and survives only because it has yet to be 
challenged directly.50 Section 77-7-8 of the Utah Code reads: 
To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in 
all cases, a peace officer, may break the door or window of the 
building in which the person to be arrested is, or in which there are 
reasonable grounds for believing him to be. Before making the 
break, the person shall demand admission and explain the purpose 
for which admission is desired. Demand and explanation need not 
be given before breaking under the exceptions in Section 77-7-651 
or where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or 
destroyed.52 
The plain language of this statute allows police officers to make 
forced entry into a home to make an arrest.53 
Utah law grants officers the authority to arrest in three 
situations: (1) when an offense is committed in the officer’s presence; 
(2) when the officer has reasonable cause to believe the suspect 
committed a felony or class A misdemeanor; and (3) when the officer 
has reasonable cause to believe that the suspect committed an offense 
and is likely to flee, to harm property or another person, or to 
destroy evidence.54 Thus, an officer with probable cause to believe 
 
 50. The only citation of section 77-7-8 in Utah case law since Payton is State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Webb, the defendant challenged statutory compliance 
rather than constitutionality, and the court refused to entertain the argument based on the 
defendant’s failure to properly raise the issue below. Id. at 77–78. 
 51. Section 77-7-6 makes the statute’s demand and explanation, or “knock and 
announce” provision, inapplicable where exigent circumstances are present. 
 52. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-8 (1980) (emphasis added). This current version was 
enacted in 1980. 
 53. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 54. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-2 (1999) reads: 
  A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace 
officer; “presence” includes all of the physical senses or any device that 
enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or records the 
observations of any of the physical senses;  
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that the suspect has committed a felony or class A misdemeanor 
“may break the door or window of the building in which the person 
to be arrested is, or in which there are reasonable grounds for 
believing him to be.”55 Additionally, even minor offenses, when 
committed in the officer’s presence, would justify a forcible entry 
and a warrantless arrest, and the statute makes no distinction 
between a dwelling and any other type of building. 
As written, section 77-7-8 is facially unconstitutional, and even 
the nation’s highest court has viewed it as such. The United States 
Supreme Court in Payton included Utah’s forced entry statute as 
among the “majority of the States that . . . permit warrantless entry 
into the home to arrest even in the absence of exigent 
circumstances.”56 As presently worded, the Utah forced entry statute 
suffers from the same fatal flaw as the New York statute struck down 
in Payton: it grants statutory authority to effect a warrantless arrest in 
the home absent consent or exigent circumstances. 
Examining the history of the forced entry statute provides some 
clues as to why it conflicts with modern case law. The Utah 
Legislature enacted the current version of the statute in 1980. The 
statutory language, however, predates Utah’s statehood.57 Enacted 
by the Governor and Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah 
on February 22, 1878, the first version of Utah’s forced entry statute 
looked remarkably similar to the current one: 
 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A misdemeanor 
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a public 
offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may:  
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;  
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or  
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another 
person. 
 55. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-8 (1980). 
 56. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 598 (1980); see id. at 598–99 n.46. Utah was 
one of twenty-three additional states that permitted by statute the type of warrantless arrest 
struck down in Payton. Other courts have agreed with the Payton Court’s survey. See Patzner 
v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1370 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[I]n 1980, 24 states . . . permitted 
warrantless arrests even absent exigent circumstances . . . .”). 
 57. Utah became a state in 1896. 1 WAYNE STOUT, HISTORY OF UTAH 520–21 (1967) 
(quoting Birth of a New State, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 5, 1896, at 1).  
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To make an arrest, if the offense is a felony, a private person, if any 
public offense, a peace officer, may break open the door or window 
in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they have 
reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after having demanded 
admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is 
desired.58 
Essentially, the current unconstitutional version has not been 
revised in any substantial way since being crafted more than 120 
years ago. While it is arguable that the statute has been in conflict 
with constitutional principles since its inception, the holdings in 
Payton and Steagald make clear that, as presently worded, section 
77-7-8 cannot sustain a direct constitutional challenge today. 
A. Possible Outcomes of a Constitutional Challenge 
A constitutional challenge to Utah’s forced entry statute can 
have only one of two outcomes: either the Utah Supreme Court will 
strike the statute down as unconstitutional per se, or the court will 
read in an implied requirement of exigent circumstances with respect 
to warrantless home arrests. 
1. Unconstitutional per se 
Because the language of section 77-7-8 clearly conflicts with the 
holdings of Payton and Steagald, the Utah Supreme Court should 
strike it down as unconstitutional on its face. 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained its duty when examining 
a statute that conflicts with established constitutional protections: 
“The statute should not be stricken down nor applied other than in 
accordance with its literal wording unless it is so unclear or confused 
as to be wholly beyond reason, or inoperable, or it contravenes some 
basic constitutional right.”59 Thus, the statute in question, although 
presumed valid,60 can be declared unconstitutional when it directly 
conflicts with constitutional liberties. 
Moreover, “[w]hen state action impinges on fundamental rights, 
due process requires standards which clearly define the scope of 
permissible conduct so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those 
 
 58. 1878 Utah Laws 23d Session, Criminal Procedure Title II, Ch. V, § 82. 
 59. Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1967) (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. 
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rights.”61 Thus, “[a] statute which affects fundamental liberties is 
unconstitutional if it is so vague that ‘men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning . . . .’”62 The court has noted 
that “[v]agueness is particularly repugnant if the statute could be 
construed to permit illegal interference with individual liberties.”63 
Section 77-7-8 is unconstitutional on its face. By using broad 
language, the statute conveys power to peace officers to force entry 
into any building, including a home, when there is intent to make an 
arrest. Working in conjunction with section 77-7-2, the forced entry 
statute mirrors the New York statute relied upon by the officers in 
Payton.64 As it currently reads, section 77-7-8 can easily “be 
construed to permit illegal interference with [the] individual 
liberties” established in Payton and Steagald.65 
The statute is vague, sweeps too broadly, and authorizes 
warrantless entries that violate the Fourth Amendment. A plain 
reading of the statute lends itself to erroneous interpretation by 
officers, who could reasonably assume that their arrest powers extend 
further than Payton, Steagald, and Welsh permit. Moreover, the 
United States Supreme Court itself apparently viewed the Utah 
statute as authorizing unconstitutional arrests.66 
If a direct constitutional challenge is made to section 77-7-8, the 
Utah Supreme Court should therefore declare it unconstitutional on 
its face.67 Nevertheless, the court could elect to uphold the statute by 
looking beyond its text. 
 
 61. In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1087–88 (Utah 1981). 
 62. Id. at 1088 (quoting State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1952)). 
 63. Id. The court distinguished, however, between vagueness and “facial imprecision in 
statutory terms,” finding the former sufficient cause to declare a statute unconstitutional but 
not necessarily the latter. See id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). 
 64. See supra notes 10, 15. The NEW YORK CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
authorized warrantless arrests for felony offenses when officers have probable cause to believe 
the suspect committed the offense. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 577 n.6. Combined with authority 
to “break open an outer or inner door or window of a building,” this section granted statutory 
authority for the warrantless entry to arrest Theodore Payton in his home for murder. Compare 
id., with supra notes 54, 55 and accompanying text. 
 65. See In re Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1088. 
 66. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Nowers v. Oakden, 169 P.2d 108, 112 (Utah 1946) (“It is not the province of 
courts to substitute what they think ought to be the law for the ambiguous or indefinite terms 
of the legislature. Rather the court should declare such an uncertain act invalid and leave to the 
legislature the task of clarifying the enactment.”). 
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2. Upheld through a reading that implies mandatory compliance with 
modern case law 
The Utah Supreme Court could uphold section 77-7-8 if it read 
into the statute an implied mandatory compliance with Payton, 
Steagald, and Welsh. 
When a statute is being examined for constitutionality, the court 
prefers to apply an alternative interpretation of the statute and to 
uphold the statute’s constitutionality where possible.68 Conceivably, 
the court could construe section 77-7-8 as permitting forced entry 
only when such entry is made to conduct a lawful arrest. The court 
could then note that absent consent or exigent circumstances, forced 
entry of a dwelling to make a warrantless arrest is not authorized 
under the statute because such an arrest has been declared unlawful 
in Payton. 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio used this alternative interpretation 
to uphold a similar forced entry statute.69 The Ohio statute in 
question authorized law enforcement officers to forcibly enter a 
dwelling or building “[w]hen making an arrest or executing a 
warrant for the arrest of a person charged with an offense, or a search 
warrant.”70 The court upheld the statute: 
The statute does not provide, as the appellants state, that an officer 
may forcibly enter a house to make a warrantless arrest absent 
exigent circumstances. The statute simply provides when an officer 
may use force to enter a home to make an arrest, execute a warrant 
for the arrest of a person, or execute a search warrant. The statute 
does not negate the requirement that the arrest or execution of a 
warrant be lawful, i.e., not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Therefore, [the statute] permits an officer to use force to enter a 
home where first, the officer has a right to enter the home to make 
an arrest or conduct a search, either by way of a warrant, or by way 
of one of the exceptions to the prohibition of warrantless entries as 
delineated by the courts; and second, the officer has given notice of 
his intention to make such arrest or search, and he is refused  
 
 
 68. See Wagner v. Salt Lake City, 504 P.2d 1007, 1012 (Utah 1972) (“It is a well-
established rule of constitutional law that where there are two alternatives as to the 
interpretation of a statute, one of which would make its constitutionality doubtful and the 
other would render it constitutional, the latter will prevail.”). 
 69. City of Middleburg Heights v. Theiss, 501 N.E.2d 1226 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). 
 70. Id. at 1230 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.12 (West 1960)). 
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admittance. In light of this rational interpretation, we conclude 
that [the statute] is not unconstitutional.71 
By implying that the officer may only enter with a warrant or 
under an exception to the warrant requirement, the Court of Appeals 
of Ohio salvaged the constitutionality of the statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court could adopt a similar interpretation of 
section 77-7-8 by viewing the statute as only allowing forced entry 
“in all cases” where the arrest being made is lawful. Further, the 
court could conclude that, because absent consent or exigent 
circumstances a warrantless home arrest is unlawful under Payton, 
such action by police would not be authorized under the statute. 
Such an interpretation relies on circular reasoning,72 and this does 
little to assist officers in understanding the constitutional limits of 
arrest powers because officers must comply with rules and limitations 
that are not expressed in the statute’s text. Thus, while this type of 
interpretation could be applied to section 77-7-8, the better 
reasoned approach would be to simply declare the statute 
unconstitutional.73 
B. Implications of the Conflict 
Regardless of the court’s decision in a direct constitutional 
challenge, the problematic implications of section 77-7-8 will persist 
unless and until the Utah Legislature revises the statute. Police 
officers might easily misunderstand the current statute and the 
limitations on their authority. In addition to leading to potentially 
enormous evidentiary errors,74 the misleading statute creates two 
 
 71. Id. at 1231. 
 72. This type of interpretation declares that such a statute authorizes forcible entry only 
where the arrest is lawful and that lawful arrests do not occur when forced entry is not 
authorized. 
 73. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 74. As Payton demonstrates, evidence seized upon unlawful forced entry into a residence 
is inadmissible at trial. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Because the officers in 
Payton entered unlawfully, the plain view evidence was fruit of the poisonous tree and 
therefore inadmissible. See Matthew F. Bogdanos, Search and Seizure: A Reasoned Approach, 6 
PACE L. REV. 543, 564 (1986). 
A hypothetical example demonstrates the potential magnitude of a Payton violation with 
respect to plain view evidence. Suppose that officers in Utah are investigating the murder of a 
motel clerk. The officers develop probable cause to believe that John Doe committed the 
murder, and when they arrive at Doe’s apartment, they see him seated at the kitchen table in a 
neighbor’s apartment. Doe and his neighbor, a convicted felon with whom the officers are 
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significant problems. First, police officers may be subjected to civil 
liability for mistakenly violating the constitutional rights of others. 
Second, by misleading those who operate under it, section 77-7-8 
fails to clearly protect the well-settled Fourth Amendment 
guarantees of Utahns. In other words, the statutory language of 
section 77-7-8 creates a lose-lose situation for both officers and 
citizens by setting the stage for unnecessary and unknowing 
constitutional violations. 
A Utah peace officer might easily misunderstand his arrest power 
under section 77-7-8 to be far broader than Payton and Steagald 
allow. Recognizing that he has probable cause to believe that a 
suspect has committed a felony, the officer can then assume that the 
statute allows him to force entry into any “building” in order to 
make the intended arrest. On its face, the statute sweeps too broadly 
and creates a trap for even well-intentioned officers who strive to 
operate within it. 
The Utah Legislature must revise the section 77-7-8 to provide 
needed guidance and to prevent police officers from 
misunderstanding the limitations of their arrest powers. Police 
officers are expected to know and understand the law and the 
limitations on their authority. Statutory provisions establish 
guidelines that govern minimum age and training requirements 
before a person can be certified as a peace officer in the State of 
Utah.75 There are statutes that define when the use of deadly force 
by an officer in the course of duty is justified and when an officer can 
 
familiar, are playing cards. Unfortunately, the officers violate Payton and Steagald by making a 
warrantless arrest after forcing entry into the neighbor’s apartment. As the officers enter, they 
conduct a routine protective sweep of the premises to ensure they have accounted for all 
occupants. One officer notices a hallway closet door is open. Inside the closet, in plain view, 
the officer sees the body of an eight-year-old girl who was reported missing from a 
neighboring town just four days earlier. The abduction investigation had been completely 
unfruitful, and officers had no previous information that might have implicated Doe or his 
neighbor in the kidnapping. In this situation, the only piece of evidence linking Doe’s 
neighbor to the missing girl is the girl’s body itself. If the body is suppressed because of the 
Payton violation, prosecutors may never be able to convict the neighbor of the abduction and 
murder. Although this hypothetical is admittedly extraordinary, it demonstrates that the 
evidentiary ramifications of unlawful home arrests could be enormous. A loss of valuable 
evidence in any case, if resulting from a good faith effort by an officer acting under a 
reasonable interpretation of section 77-7-8, would be even more tragic because it might have 
been avoided had the state legislature revised the statute. 
 75. See Chapters 6 and 13 of Title 53 in the Utah Code for a discussion of certification 
requirements. 
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make a warrantless arrest.76 After several weeks of complex training at 
Utah’s Peace Officer Standards and Training (“POST”), rookie 
officers can begin working on patrol. 
Through application on the streets of principles learned at 
POST, officers develop a working knowledge of areas of law, 
including search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.77 
During the first few years of experience, officers refer repeatedly to 
the Utah Traffic and Criminal Code in order to verify and clarify 
their understanding of statutory authorizations and limitations. Even 
though POST instructors strive to provide specific instruction on 
modern constitutional principles of warrantless home arrests, officers 
need an opportunity to develop a working knowledge before they 
can be expected to understand the precise limits of their arrest 
powers. This kind of understanding can only come by real-life 
application and continual reference to constantly evolving statutory 
guidelines. 
The duty of revising this statute rests squarely on the collective 
shoulders of Utah legislators. When the Utah Supreme Court strikes 
down a statute as unconstitutional, it is the responsibility of the Utah 
Legislature to repeal the section. When the court upholds a statute 
because it meets constitutional minimums, the court “has a duty to 
let it operate as the legislature has provided.”78 Additionally, the 
legislature passes statutes to define police powers and to provide 
guidance to officers who derive their authority from the state. In 
order to meet this goal, the legislature should eliminate the broad 
and imprecise language of section 77-7-8 in favor of a version that 
properly limits forcible entries and that recognizes modern Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Such action would constitute a win-win 
situation: in addition to protection from civil liability, officers acting 
under the statute would receive more precise and accurate guidance 
while Utahns would be protected from unnecessary violations of 
clearly established rights. 
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a law enforcement 
officer is protected from liability for injuries to others unless the 
officer violates a clearly established right that the officer should have 
 
 76. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404 (1987) (when deadly force is justified); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-7-2 (1999) (when warrantless arrests are permitted). 
 77. See infra note 95. 
 78. Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1967). 
BEL-FIN 11/15/2002 4:46 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
1148 
known to exist.79 Officers and legislators alike may mistakenly assume 
that qualified immunity will protect officers who reasonably rely on 
section 77-7-8 when committing a Payton violation. However, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has made it 
clear that illegal warrantless home arrests can give rise to civil 
liability. 
In Howard v. Dickerson,80 the court rejected an officer’s request 
for qualified immunity from a Payton violation. During the course of 
an investigation, Officer Dickerson identified Howard as a suspect in 
a hit-and-run accident. Dickerson responded to Howard’s home and 
arrested her. Howard filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 198381 and argued 
that her arrest violated the protections afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment. The court examined whether the warrantless home 
arrest violated clearly established law, calling Payton a “long-
established constitutional principle[].”82 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial judge’s refusal to 
grant summary judgment for Dickerson. Dickerson argued that his 
warrantless home arrest of Howard was both authorized and 
required under New Mexico law and that if state law conflicted with 
the Fourth Amendment, such conflict was not clearly established at 
the time. The court found Dickerson’s argument unpersuasive: 
Though the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code authorizes 
warrantless arrests in some instances, this license is circumscribed 
by the Fourth Amendment. The warrantless arrest at Ms. Howard’s 
home violated the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable 
seizures. Any New Mexico law which might have condoned Officer 
Dickerson’s actions will not protect him from the consequences of his 
clearly illegal conduct. The district court, therefore, properly denied 
Officer Dickerson’s claim of qualified immunity and rejected his 
 
 79. Law enforcement officers “may not be held liable for [the plaintiff’s] injury if their 
conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person should have known.” Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1369 (8th Cir. 
1985) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1982)). 
 80. 34 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 81. When a § 1983 claim is filed, a defendant can claim qualified immunity from 
potentially unconstitutional acts. “When a defendant raises the issue of qualified immunity on a 
summary judgment motion, the plaintiff must demonstrate the alleged conduct constituted a 
violation of law and the law was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Id. at 981 
(citation omitted); see also supra note 79. 
 82. Howard, 34 F.3d at 982. The court also noted that the offense for which Howard 
was arrested was extremely minor and “d[id] not merit the extraordinary recourse of 
warrantless home arrest.” Id. 
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motions for summary judgment and dismissal on the Fourth 
Amendment claim.83 
Thus, although reasonably believing his actions to be permitted 
under state law, Officer Dickerson became subject to liability for 
violating clearly established rights.84 It is unsettling to know that 
well-intentioned officers acting under a reasonable interpretation of 
state law might unknowingly violate a suspect’s rights and then be 
denied immunity for their objectively reasonable, good faith reliance 
on a statute. 
Even if the Utah Supreme Court holds that 77-7-8 is 
unconstitutional, the legislature needs to revise the section’s 
language to provide needed guidance to officers. At least one state 
legislature failed to take action after a similar forced entry statute was 
ruled unconstitutional. In the wake of Payton, the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota struck down a state law that permitted warrantless 
home arrests.85 Despite the clarity of the conflict between the statute 
and Payton, the North Dakota Legislature has yet to repeal or revise 
the section, leaving officers with little guidance.86 
Without adequate statutory guidance, some North Dakota 
officers have unfortunately found themselves operating outside the 
constitutional limits of their authority. The Eighth Circuit, in 
Patzner v. Burkett,87 rejected North Dakota officers’ claims of 
qualified immunity for making a warrantless arrest in the suspect’s 
 
 83. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 84. Despite the alleged conflict between state law and Payton, the court found no 
objective reasonableness in the warrantless home arrest of Howard. The district court below 
“noted state law does not trump the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 980. The circuit court 
summarized, “[a]gainst the backdrop of these long-established constitutional principles, 
Officer Dickerson’s claim for qualified immunity is patently disingenuous.” Id. at 982. 
 85. State v. Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 539, 541 (N.D. 1981). The North Dakota statute 
provided that “[a]n officer may break open any door or window of a dwelling house to execute 
a warrant of arrest, or to make such arrest for a felony without a warrant . . . if, after notice of 
his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-14 (1943). 
 86. The unconstitutional statute remains in the code with the following note in the 
annotation: “The [S]upreme [C]ourt of North Dakota declared this section to be 
unconstitutional because it violated the [F]ourth [A]mendment of the United States 
Constitution by permitting the warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in the 
absence of exigent circumstances to make a routine felony arrest.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-
14 (1943 & Supp. 1991) (citing State v. Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1981)). While this 
notation provides some instruction on the Payton rule, it gives no guidance on the principles 
set forth in Steagald or Welsh. 
 87. 779 F.2d 1363 (1985). 
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home absent exigent circumstances.88 Instead, the court held that 
the officers were not immune from suit, finding the illegality of the 
arrest “not seriously open to question at the time it occurred.”89 Had 
the officers received better guidance from their state legislature 
regarding the scope of their arrest powers, perhaps that violation—
and the civil liability stemming from it—could have been avoided. 
Like the officers in Howard and Patzner, Utah law enforcement 
officers could find themselves without qualified immunity for actions 
based on a reasonable interpretation of authority under section 77-7-
8. By revising the statute, the legislature would assist Utah peace 
officers in better understanding the constitutional limits on their 
arrest powers. The benefits of a revision would necessarily extend to 
the citizens of Utah by explicitly recognizing established 
constitutional mandates and by significantly reducing the likelihood 
of good faith violations. 
 
 88. The court explained qualified immunity did not exist for a Payton violation: 
When this arrest took place in April of 1983, . . . Payton w[as a] firmly entrenched 
legal guidepost[], and had removed any doubt that the privacy of the home is 
paramount in weighing [F]ourth [A]mendment concerns. It should have been 
obvious that if the home is to be protected against warrantless arrests for felonies, as 
Payton established, the home should be even more sacrosanct from invasion for 
warrantless arrests for minor crimes, requiring a far greater showing of exigency than 
that alleged here. The North Dakota legislature has apparently so concluded as well. 
The arrest in this case is no longer sanctioned by North Dakota law. The statute 
authorizing warrantless home arrests had been declared unconstitutional by the 
North Dakota Supreme Court in the wake of Payton two years earlier. . . . We 
conclude that the illegality of Patzner’s arrest was not seriously open to question at 
the time it occurred. We hold, therefore, that the deputies are not immune from suit 
with respect to Patzner’s claims of illegal arrest. 
Id. at 1370–71 (citation omitted). 
The court’s claim that “[t]he North Dakota legislature has apparently so concluded as 
well” is an oddity. The statute was indeed struck down by the North Dakota Supreme Court, 
and the state legislature has yet to repeal or revise the provision. The only reason that such 
arrests are “no longer sanctioned by North Dakota law” is the ruling in Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 
539. How legislative inaction equates with a conclusion is unclear. It is worth noting that the 
Eighth Circuit called Payton a “firmly entrenched legal guidepost[]” as early as 1983. Patzner, 
779 F.2d at 1370. 
 89. Patzner, 779 F.2d at 1371. 
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IV. PROPOSED REVISION OF SECTION 77-7-890 
Because section 77-7-8 conflicts with current Fourth 
Amendment case law and because unknowing Payton violations can 
give rise to police liability, it is imperative that the Utah Legislature 
revise the statute. In order to comply with the rules promulgated in 
Payton and Steagald, the following revision of section 77-7-8 is 
recommended: 
77-7-8. Forced entry to make an arrest permitted, when. 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), when making an arrest, a peace 
officer may forcibly enter the building in which the person to 
be arrested is, or in which there are reasonable grounds for 
believing him to be. Before forcibly entering, the officer shall 
demand admission and explain the purpose for which 
admission is desired. Demand and explanation need not be 
given before forcibly entering under the exceptions in Section 
77-7-6 or where there is reason to believe evidence will be 
secreted or destroyed. 
(2) Absent consent to enter or the existence of exigent 
circumstances, if the building is known by the officer to be or 
reasonably appears to be a dwelling, the officer must:  
(a) obtain an arrest or search warrant before entering the 
dwelling if it is the residence of the person to be arrested; 
or  
(b) obtain a search warrant before entering the dwelling if 
the person to be arrested does not reside therein. 
This revision makes several significant improvements to the 
statute, including the codification of the holdings in Payton and 
Steagald.91 The proposal provides law enforcement officers92 with 
 
 90. In the spring 2002, the author presented a proposal to revise section 77-7-8 to the 
Legislative Advisory Committee of Utah’s Statewide Association of Public Attorneys 
(“SWAP”). More recently, SWAP has agreed to support the proposed revision and to seek out 
a legislative sponsor to present the bill in the 2003 Utah Legislative Session. 
 91. Although the holding in Welsh serves as a limiting principle on the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, it need not be incorporated into the text 
of the statute until it is more clearly defined and is more threatening to an officer’s claim of 
qualified immunity. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 92. Another noticeable change is the proposal’s elimination of any reference to private 
persons. This change recognizes that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to actions by 
private citizens. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“This Court has . . . 
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meaningful guidance as to the limitations of their authority to make 
warrantless home arrests. It replaces the phrase “break the door or 
window” of the building in question with the more precise 
description “forcibly enter.” While forcing entry may require the 
breaking of a door or window, the current wording “break the door 
or window” does not provide explicit authority for officers to enter 
the building after making the break. The current text also limits the 
use of force to breaking “the door or window” of the suspect’s 
hiding place. Changing the statute to permit officers to “forcibly 
enter” clarifies the text and provides officers with alternative points 
of entry should the need arise.93 The proposal also makes a 
distinction between buildings generally and dwellings, providing 
specific additional requirements applicable to private homes in the 
absence of consent to enter or the existence of exigent 
circumstances. Subsection 2(a) represents the rule in Payton and 
informs officers of the need to obtain an arrest or search warrant 
prior to forcing entry into the suspect’s residence. Subsection 2(b) 
reflects the holding in Steagald by requiring a search warrant prior to 
forcibly entering a third-party’s residence. 
By providing Utah law enforcement agents with meaningful 
guidance, this proposed revision would substantially reduce the 
likelihood of unknowing constitutional violations by officers. It 
would also expressly recognize the constitutionally mandated sanctity 
of the home as expressed in modern Fourth Amendment case law. In 
short, this proposal protects both officers and citizens alike from 
unnecessary intrusion of clearly established Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
 
consistently construed this protection as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly 
inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual 
not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any 
governmental official.’” (citation omitted)). If the Utah Legislature wishes to retain statutory 
authority for private persons to make forcible entry felony arrests, the issue can be addressed in 
state tort law. 
 93. The proposal would authorize an officer to enter a building through a non-
traditional point of entry if, for example, reasons of officer safety made entry via a rooftop vent 
preferable to forcing open bar-covered windows or reinforced doors. Of course, this broader 
grant of authority would still be circumscribed by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
requirement. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1990); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Utah’s forced entry statute conflicts with well-established 
principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Although the statute 
has yet to be subjected to a direct constitutional challenge, such an 
attack will require the Utah Supreme Court to either strike the 
statute down as unconstitutional or to imply required compliance 
with modern case law that restricts police power more than the 
broad language of the statute suggests. The Utah Legislature needs 
to revise the statute to provide peace officers more accurate guidance 
with respect to arrest powers. Until the statute is revised, officers are 
likely to view their authority as broader than modern cases allow. 
This misunderstanding may subject officers to civil liability for 
violating clearly established rights. The outdated statute also fails to 
recognize the mandated sanctity of the home.94 By revising the 
statute, Utah legislators can create a win-win situation by protecting 
peace officers and citizens alike from the undesirable consequences of 
unnecessary Fourth Amendment violations. 














 94. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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